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Turkey and the Arab Revolt:  
Rise or Decline in Regional Politics?
André Bank
On 20 September 2011, at a meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama, Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called once again for an end to the regime of Bashar al-
Assad in Syria. It was not until after the failure of the most recent Turkish mediation 
initiative on 9 August 2011 that Ankara began to officially call for regime change in Da-
mascus.
Analysis
The Arab revolt has been changing the regional order in the Middle East since the end 
of 2010 and, furthermore, has influenced the potential of individual states to move up 
or down the ladder in regional politics. Under the AKP administration of Prime Minis-
ter Erdoğan, Turkey presents itself on one hand as a role model for transitioning Arab 
countries, but on the other hand its regional policy is marked by inconsistencies.
  Turkey’s Middle East policy under the AKP is dictated by two main sets of goals, 
one dealing with economic and trade expansion and the second with soft pow-
er generation. But as the first set of goals requires stability and necessitates coop-
erating with authoritarian regimes, while the second set of goals, manifested in 
Erdoğan’s populist rhetoric, has continued to produce instability, the contradictory 
nature of those goals was evident even before 2011. 
  At the beginning of the Arab revolt, the Turkish government advocated for an end 
to the Mubarak regime in Egypt. In regards to Libya, however, Ankara conducted 
itself quite a bit more carefully due to its close economic ties with Libya, the Turk-
ish government distancing itself only over time from Qaddafi.
  Syria represents the biggest political challenge in the region for Turkey. With a two-
pronged strategy of making direct offers to Assad while simultaneously courting 
parts of the opposition, Turkey was able to keep many different communication 
channels open with the country until August 2011.
  In the big picture, the alleged “skittishness” of Turkey’s regional policy could al-
so be viewed as a largely successful series of adaptations to the transformation pro-
cesses brought about by the Arab revolt. Thanks to this pragmatism and Erdoğan’s 
populism, Turkey will probably occupy a prominent position in the Middle East, at 
least for a short time.
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The Rise of the AKP in Turkish Politics
Since the parliamentary elections of November 
2002, Turkey has been led by the Justice and De-
velopment Party (AKP), conservative Islamist pro-
ponents of a free market. The AKP’s latest success 
in the parliamentary elections of 12 June 2011 – 
in which the party, under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, received 49.9 per-
cent of the votes, its most successful turnout thus 
far – underscores the party’s new-found hege-
monic position in Turkish politics. The AKP’s im-
mense increase in power in the early 2000s accom-
panied the extensive fall from power of the Turk-
ish military, which had in the two decades since 
the coup of 1980 to a large extent steered the polit-
ical fate of the country (Jung 2011).
The growing influence and consolidation of the 
AKP can be explained, first, by the domestic polit-
ical liberalizations, which from 2002 to 2005 were 
clearly made in the context of the prospect of Tur-
key’s accession to the European Union. These lib-
eralizations included extensive reforms that were 
carried out in various areas such as administrative 
practices, the justice system, the media, and with-
in civil society organizations. Second, the AKP 
profited from the strong growth of the Turkish 
economy, which since 2002 (except for the worst 
years of the international financial crisis, 2008 and 
2009) has achieved between 4 and 10 percent gains 
per annum and which made Turkey’s accession to 
the G20 possible. Even though the benefits of the 
economic windfall continue to be distributed very 
unequally and the income gap between Turkey’s 
rich and its poor has not shrunk under the AKP, 
Erdoğan and his party were able to gain political 
capital from the economic boom (Dağdas 2011). 
Furthermore, under the AKP, a new bourgeoisie, 
a number of whom are settled far from Istanbul – 
Turkey’s traditional economic center – has gained 
economic and political influence. Most of these 
entrepreneurs, sometimes called “Anatolian Ti-
gers,” are members of the Independent Industri-
alists and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSIAD).
Third, the AKP’s foreign policy reorientation 
has contributed to its large domestic populari-
ty. Traditionally, Turkish foreign policy has been 
characterized by a Western orientation deeply 
anchored in a Kemalist nation-building process. 
This Western orientation is evidenced by Tur-
key’s membership in NATO (since 1952) as well 
as its decades-long ambition to join the European 
Union. Even though this crux of Turkish foreign 
policy has so far remained intact throughout the 
2000s, and will likely still be prominent in the com-
ing years, a stronger “multidimensionality” (Kra-
mer 2010) and a diversification of alliances outside 
the West is also characteristic for the “new Turk-
ish foreign policy” under the AKP (Pope 2010). 
As a leitmotiv, we can apply the strategic “zero 
problems (with the neighbors)” doctrine preached 
by Ahmet Davutoğlu, the current foreign minis-
ter and previously Erdoğan’s chief foreign poli-
cy consultant. According to Davutoğlu, instead of 
a cautious, reactive and from time to time suspi-
cious approach to its regional environment, Tur-
key should negotiate proactively and look prag-
matically for opportunities to solve conflicts and 
create cooperation. As a junction and a bridge be-
tween Western Europe, the Balkans, Eastern Eu-
rope, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Mid-
dle East, Turkey might be virtually predestined 
to have such a foreign policy. The Middle East is 
the region in which Davutoğlu’s doctrine, partic-
ularly in the AKP’s second term of administration 
(since 2007), has been most comprehensively ef-
fectuated.
Turkey’s Middle East Policy
Within the context of the “zero problems” doc-
trine, two dominant, transnational features of Tur-
key’s Middle East policy are: 
 − geo-economic ambitions, economic relation-
ships, and 
 − the non-material interest in the generation of 
soft power – in other words, the creation of ide-
ological support for Turkish policy in the Mid-
dle East (Altunışık 2008; Pope 2010). 
The geo-economic driving forces of Turkey’s Mid-
dle East policy can be illustrated by the signifi-
cantly increased volumes of capital ex penditures 
and trade that have occurred under the AKP gov-
ernment, as well as by the diversity of Turkish 
business partners in the region.
Energy cooperation and especially the avail-
ability of reliable and cheap natural gas and oil 
played an important role in Turkey’s relations 
with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In turn, Turkish 
companies in Iran were active in the areas of con-
struction and infrastructure. This interweaving of 
foreign trade policy also explains why the Turk-
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ish government – despite differing ideological ori-
entations – welcomed the controversial June 2009 
re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, 
and why Turkey voted against a tightening of the 
sanctions against Iran that was being called for 
by Western nations in the U.N. Security Council, 
in which Turkey had a seat as a non-permanent 
member in 2009 and 2010.
In Kurdish-dominated northern Iraq, Anato-
lian companies with close ties to the AKP adminis-
tration are so financially active that any closing of 
the border on the part of Turkey would cause sub-
stantial economic turbulence in that area, which 
is controlled by the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
under Massoud Barzani. Similar to the economic 
cooperation Turkey developed with Iran was that 
which it formed with Libya under Muammar Qa-
ddafi: Turkey imported Libyan oil, and Turkish 
construction, tourism, energy and retail business-
es were active in Libya. In each of the years 2008 
and 2009, the volume of bilateral trade amounted 
to nearly 10 billion USD (Mattes 2011: 243f.).
The rapprochement between the AKP admin-
istration and Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, 
was also largely economically motivated. In light 
of the years-long animosity between Turkey and 
Syria, which nearly escalated into war in 1998, the 
formation of “brotherly relations” between Anka-
ra and Damascus through a diversity of collabor-
ative projects − a high point of this being the joint 
cabinet meetings in 2010 – is particularly remark-
able. In its relations with Syria, Turkey had capi-
tal expenditures and trade close to the border in 
its field of view. But Turkey also strove to devel-
op a new transit route, which would run primarily 
through Jordan and Iraq and carry domestic prod-
ucts into the financially strong Gulf states. Anoth-
er development to come out of the new economic 
relationship was Turkey’s 2009 dissolving of visa 
restrictions for Syrian citizens: by the end of 2010, 
approximately 60,000 Syrians were visiting Tur-
key monthly.
Along with geo-economic interests, the forma-
tion of soft power in the Middle East is also a main 
feature of Turkey’s regional policy. Prime Minis-
ter Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu and 
President Abdullah Gül (also from the AKP) used 
primarily two tactics: For one thing, they continu-
ously promoted, however subtly, a “Turkish mod-
el” for the Middle East in their political speeches 
and statements. This model includes – with vary-
ing degrees of emphasis – elements of pluralism 
and party-based democracy, a successful econo-
my, religious and cultural authenticity, and a rel-
atively independent foreign policy, all of which 
amounts to a self-description of the AKP admin-
istration.
The administration also developed a strong an-
ti-Israel, pro-Palestine rhetoric after the start of the 
war in Gaza on 27 December 2008, rhetoric which 
at times came off as clearly populist. The reason 
for such rhetoric was the visible irritation on the 
part of Ankara, which, despite the intensive medi-
ations it had been conducting between Israel and 
Syria since May 2008, got no advance notice from 
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s administration 
about the imminent war in the Gaza Strip. Anka-
ra was also visibly jarred by the way Israel con-
ducted the war, which led to the deaths of 1,300 
civilians, almost of all of whom were Palestinians. 
At the meeting of the World Economic Forum in 
Davos at the end of January 2009, Prime Minis-
ter Erdoğan turned openly against Israel’s presi-
dent, Shimon Peres, for the first time. The wors-
ening of Turkish−Israeli relations reached a new 
low with the Gaza flotilla affair at the end of May/
beginning of June 2010: After Israeli commandos 
boarded the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara, an aid 
convoy, in the Eastern Mediterranean and ended 
up killing eight Turks and an American–Turkish 
dual citizen, the conflict between Turkey and Is-
rael escalated to a previously unprecedented lev-
el. While the Israeli side insisted that the Gaza aid 
flotilla was illegal, that its forces were provoked, 
and that the commandos acted essentially defen-
sively, the Turkish side demanded both a legal in-
vestigation of the Israeli military’s intervention in 
international waters and a comprehensive apol-
ogy from Israel. Turkey’s obdurate positions re-
garding the Gaza aid flotilla also hindered every 
attempt at a rapprochement between Turkey and 
Israel after the summer of 2010. 
In a wider regional context of the Middle East, 
Turkey’s decidedly pro-Palestine stance entailed 
that it distance itself from Egypt under Hosni 
Mubarak, and that it also reject his pro-West and 
pro-Israel attitudes regarding the Gaza Strip and 
the party that has been in power there since 2007, 
Hamas. Turkey played a more moderate tune in 
respect to the governments of Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia, which are perceived as just as pro-West; 
particularly with respect to Saudi Arabia, econom-
ic considerations once again played a central role.
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The geo-economic features as well as the non-
material features of the AKP’s foreign policy vis-
à-vis the Middle East can be widely seen as suc-
cessfully initiated. The anti-Israel and pro-Pales-
tine rhetoric as well as the suggestion of a “Turk-
ish model” for the Middle East were, according 
to opinion polls, endorsed by wide swaths of the 
various Arab populations; for a majority of them, 
Prime Minister Erdoğan even represented the 
most well-liked politician in the world in 2010. 
But the seemingly successful Turkish Middle East 
policy under the AKP cannot hide the fundamen-
tal conflict of interests between its geo-economic 
and non-material goals: On the one hand, Turkish 
interests in economic cooperation, trade and in-
vestments in the Middle East call for a stable sur-
rounding political environment and a pragmatic 
collaboration with authoritarian regimes, whether 
they be in Iran, northern Iraq, Libya, Syria or Sau-
di Arabia. On the other hand, because of the pop-
ulistic generation of soft power, the status quo in 
the Middle East – especially regarding the Israel-
Palestine conflict – is being called into question. 
This basic contradiction led, among other things, 
to the AKP administration discontinuation of the 
propagation of its “Turkish model,” beyond its 
economic components, to its important trade part-
ners Iran, Libya and Syria. That move evinces the 
pragmatism of the AKP’s Middle East policy. The 
worsening of Turkish–Israeli relations since 2009 
shows, however, that the policy of “zero prob-
lems” with the neighbors does not always work, 
and sometimes displays wishful thinking on the 
part of Turkey rather than regional political real-
ities.
Turkey and the Upheavals in North Africa
On the eve of the Arab revolt of 2011, Turkey un-
der the leadership of the AKP demonstrated defin-
ing characteristics of a regional power in the Mid-
dle East – namely, successful economic diversifi-
cation; cooperative relations with the influential 
countries of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria; and the 
support of a wide section of the Arab populace. In 
the face of the huge changes that emanated from 
North Africa and have been shaping the whole re-
gion since 2011, Turkey risked losing political in-
fluence. How did the Turkish government react to 
the upheavals in the most crucial Arab states?
Like most other administrations, Ankara was 
caught off-guard by the rapid political dynam-
ics that have been playing out since January 2011. 
The AKP government initially temporized the de-
velopments in Tunisia: Because its own econom-
ic interests were not really entangled with the ti-
ny North African country, Turkey generally spoke 
out on the side of political reforms and finding the 
least violent solution possible to the conflict be-
tween the regime and the protest movement. Af-
ter President Ben Ali fled surprisingly quickly into 
exile in Saudi Arabia on 14 January 2011, the Turk-
ish government immediately declared its support 
for the Tunisian transitional government.
Similarly, in the case of Egypt, Turkey avoid-
ed aligning itself with one side or the other in the 
initial days of the mass protests in order to avoid 
getting stuck in a position too early, which in light 
of the very strained Turkish–Egyptian relations 
could have easily occurred. After the escalation 
in violence between the Mubarak regime’s forces 
and the demonstrators in Cairo’s Tahrir Square at 
the end of January 2011, Prime Minister Erdoğan 
reacted on 1 February 2011 by holding a speech, 
which was widely watched and broadcast live in 
the Arab world, before an assembly of his par-
ty’s parliamentarians. While the U.S. President 
Barack Obama was almost at the same time call-
ing for moderation on both sides, Erdoğan posi-
tioned himself firmly on the side of the protestors. 
Although he did not specifically call for Mubarak 
to step down, his statements, directly addressed at 
the Egyptian president, could be interpreted as a 
demand for Mubarak to bow out of Egyptian pol-
itics. Erdoğan’s speech was widely lauded by ma-
ny Arabs, as he was the first leader of an impor-
tant country who had spoken out on behalf of the 
protest movement. After Mubarak stepped down 
on 11 February 2011 and the ruling military coun-
cil took over power, the Turkish government was 
successful at keeping open various channels of 
communication with the most important actors in 
post-Mubarak Egyptian politics.
Though the Turkish government openly called 
for the Mubarak regime to come to an end rela-
tively early on, it reacted to the violence in Lib-
ya much more cautiously (cf. Faath 2011: 7f.). An-
kara spoke out on behalf of a violence-free res-
olution to the conflict between the Qaddafi re-
gime and the primarily eastern Libyan rebels and 
once again offered to mediate. Unlike in Tunisia, 
in Libya, central economic and security interests 
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of Turkey were being touched upon: because of 
the tight ties with Tripoli, 30,000 Turkish citizens 
were working in Libya at the time of the escalation 
of violence (February 2011), primarily in the con-
struction sector. The AKP determined it was nec-
essary to secure the evacuation of Turkish citizens, 
a procedure that ended successfully in mid-March 
2011. Despite the quick escalation of violence be-
tween Libyan government troops and the opposi-
tional rebels, Ankara initially avoided distancing 
itself too decisively from revolutionary leader Qa-
ddafi. Nevertheless, Ankara continuously plead-
ed with the Libyan ruler for a comprehensive 
ceasefire. The Turkish position was widely criti-
cized (although Ankara had previously been well 
thought of by the Arab public) because it showed 
itself to be rather superficially oriented to its own 
nationalistic interests rather than the goals of the 
protest movements.
The flexible, at times mutable, “middle” po-
sition of Turkey became further evident in its 
stance regarding U.N. security resolution 1973 of 
17 March 2011, which provided for a no-fly zone 
over Libya for the protection of the civilians: Even 
when Ankara voiced its skepticism of the over-
reaching NATO mandate (“U.N.-mandated re-
gime change”), as a NATO member, Turkey even-
tually voted for the resolution, in contrast to Ger-
many, Brazil and India. After various Turkish me-
diation attempts failed, Erdoğan publicly and di-
rectly called for Qaddafi to step down at the begin-
ning of May 2011. The main driver of this change 
in tack was probably the tipping of the scales un-
doubtedly in favor of the rebels and the Transi-
tional National Council, due to the massive NATO 
intervention. After the electoral victory of the AKP 
in the parliamentary elections of 12 June 2011, Tur-
key recognized the Transitional National Council 
as the legitimate representative of the Libyan peo-
ple. After NATO-supported rebels captured Trip-
oli at the end of August 2011, signifying the end of 
the Qaddafi regime, Turkey was among the first 
states to reopen its embassy in Tripoli, and it en-
couraged an immediate resumption of econom-
ic relations – now with the Transitional National 
Council as the Libyan counterpart.
Turkey and the Revolt in Syria
Syria represents the greatest foreign policy chal-
lenge for Turkey in the context of the Arab revolt 
of 2011. Due to the 850-kilometer-long border and 
the formation of “brotherly relations” between 
the two countries, which was based on the afore-
mentioned collaborations of previous years, every 
new transformation in Syria has direct and mul-
tifaceted implications for Turkey’s domestic poli-
cy. Kurdish political activism provides one exam-
ple: Recently, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
carried out more attacks in Turkey. The PKK also 
recently shifted one of its refuges to a Kurdish ar-
ea of northeast Syria. Second, especially close re-
lations evolved in 2009 between the regions along 
the border (around Gaziantep and Antakya on 
the Turkish side and near Aleppo on the Syrian 
side) due to the increased trade levels and the new 
freedom that Syrians had to enter Turkey with-
out a visa. Third, Turkey’s ruling AKP has close 
contacts with the Syrian opposition and particu-
larly with the equally conservative Sunni Mus-
lim Brotherhood, which was heavily persecuted 
by the Ba’thist regime under President Hafiz and 
which continues to be persecuted today by Presi-
dent Assad.
As the deaths of three youths involved in the 
mass protests occurred on 18 March 2011 in the 
southern Syrian provincial town of Daraa – the 
mass protests having been violently repressed by 
Syrian security forces – Turkey found itself in a 
dilemma: Due to the strategic relations and Tur-
key’s interest in a stable neighbor country, Ankara 
could neither distance itself too far from President 
Assad nor risk being perceived as being too close 
to Assad’s authoritarian regime, lest it risk failing 
in its goal of generating soft power among the Ar-
ab populations. With that in mind, the AKP gov-
ernment followed a two-pronged strategy in re-
gards to the protests in Syria (which in just a few 
days had expanded from Daraa to Latakiya in the 
west, Dair az-Zwar in the northeast, and Homs 
and Hama in central Syria, and with that basically 
every part of the country except the urban centers 
of Damascus and Aleppo):
Turkey publicly called for restraint with re-
spect to Assad’s handling of the protestors, and 
it demanded and the implementation of exten-
sive political reforms. The Turkish government 
voiced this position before Assad’s first speech of 
30 March 2011 (an address that dashed the hopes 
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of many Syrians for reform) and regularly reiter-
ated it afterward. By August 2011, Foreign Minis-
ter Davutoğlu had already traveled more than ten 
times to Syria in order to engage in direct talks 
with the powers that be in Damascus.
However, Turkey had also begun to court the 
Syrian opposition early on. As early as 1 April 
2011 – not even two weeks after the protests began 
in Daraa – leaders of the Syrian Muslim Brother-
hood held a press conference in Istanbul, which 
although the Turkish government did not host, 
could not have occurred without at least the tac-
it acceptance of the government. In the period fol-
lowing that, as both the intensity of the protests 
and the regime’s repression of them increased, 
Turkey became the central meeting and coordi-
nation point for the Syrian opposition. More than 
half of the big conferences held by the Syrian op-
position in 2011 took place in Turkey: Elements 
of the opposition met on 26 April in Istanbul, on 
2 June in Antalya, on 16 July back in Istanbul, in 
mid-August again in Istanbul, at the end of Au-
gust in Ankara, and on 15 September once again 
in Istanbul. Even if the specific forms of network-
ing and personal connections between the AKP 
administration and the Syrian opposition remain 
unclear, it is safe to assume that the AKP could 
strongly influence the Syrian opposition.
When the Syrian regime’s troops marched in-
to the northern Syrian provincial town of Jisr ash-
Shughur and violently crushed the uprising there 
at the beginning of June 2011, nearly 10,000 Syri-
ans fled en masse over the border to Turkey. This 
led Prime Minister Erdoğan to criticize the Syrian 
regime in a way he never had before. The fear of a 
mass exodus from and a de-stabilization of neigh-
boring areas were not the only factors to play a de-
cisive role in Turkey’s decision to criticize the Syr-
ian regime in this way: If we take a closer look at 
the time frame, we can also explain Erdoğan’s re-
action by acknowledging that the AKP adminis-
tration wanted to distance itself further from the 
Assad regime in the run up to the parliamenta-
ry elections of 12 June 2011 in order to please the 
Turkish people, who largely sympathized with 
the Syrian protest movement. After their elector-
al victory, the AKP administration seemed to once 
again immediately tolerate the repression of the 
protests – it hoped that the repression would help 
re-stabilize Syria and bring about gradual reforms 
there. Ankara began to break away more when in 
July 2011 the Syrian regime noticeably descend-
ed further into isolation on an international lev-
el, and particularly on a regional level (Qatar, Ku-
wait and Saudi Arabia all cut off relations with 
Syria). At the beginning of Ramadan on 9 August 
2011, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu again traveled 
to Damascus to prevail upon President Assad to 
take a more moderate stance. After that mediation 
initiative failed, Ankara officially began to call 
for regime change in Damascus – a position that 
Prime Minister Erdoğan underscored at an infor-
mal meeting with U.S. President Obama on the 
periphery of a convening of the U.N. general as-
sembly in New York on 20 September 2011.
Regional Rise or Decline?
As the reactions to the political upheavals in North 
Africa and the conflict in Syria show, Turkish for-
eign policy in the context of the Arab revolt of 2011 
is characterized by frequent changes of position: 
While on one hand, Erdoğan’s AKP advocated 
relatively early on for the end of the Mubarak re-
gime, it behaved quite a bit more cautiously in re-
gards to Libya out of geo-economic concerns. The 
Turkish government backed away from Qaddafi 
bit by bit so that in the near future it could play a 
prominent role in Libya’s transformation process, 
a fact underscored by Erdoğan’s closely observed 
state visit to Tripoli in mid-September 2011. Due 
to its multifaceted economic and security inter-
ests in Syria, Turkey held to their pragmatic “mid-
dle” position between the Assad regime and the 
opposition. In this, the AKP government succeed-
ed, as by August 2011 they were the only coun-
try to have held multiple channels of communica-
tion open in Syria. At the moment that the isola-
tion of Assad’s regime became perfectly clear, An-
kara washed its hands of Damascus. Even though 
Turkey is officially calling for an end to Assad’s re-
gime in Syria, it is operating cautiously out of con-
cern for the further possible de-stabilizing effects 
his downfall could have.
In the end, the purported “skittishness” of 
Turkish foreign policy under the AKP can be con-
sidered a series of successful policy ad justments 
to the transformation processes in North Afri-
ca and the Middle East that have been on going 
since the beginning of 2011. Although Ankara po-
tentially has a lot to lose in the Arab revolt, af-
ter three-quarters of a year, it can claim to have 
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climbed up the regional ladder, as states such as 
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel have clearly profit-
ed less, and the situation in Egypt is not yet sta-
ble. Even though Turkish regional policy is in no 
way free of contradictions, its dominant pragma-
tism and proactive commitment in various re-
gional arenas definitely contributed to its current 
prominent position. Additionally, Erdoğan’s pop-
ulistic remarks, which since the summer of 2011 
have become more and more anti-Israel and pro-
Palestine (contributing to the goal of generating 
soft power), are being positively responded to by 
the currently strongly mobilized Arab public. This 
mix of pragmatism and populism could, at least in 
the short term, secure a vanguard position for Tur-
key in the Middle East.
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